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RURAL DEVELOPMENT
IN KASUMPA VILLAGE, ZAMBIA*

by

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I. INTRODUCTION

For many rural dwellers in Zambia, as well as elsewhere in Africa, the movement toward independence represented an attempted movement toward a higher standard of living. The displacement of the colonial authorities and the installation of an African government represented a shift from a public order whose primary interest was the maintenance of law and order in the rural areas to a government which had come to power by promising to fulfill the demands of the indigenous peoples that they be made better off. As a result of the commitments made in the bid for power, out of a regard for its future fate at the polls, and because of its genuine regard for the welfare of its citizens, the new Zambian government, like other governments in Africa, initiated programs designed to upgrade the standard of living of its basically rural constituents. Utilizing the revenues generated by the prosperous mining industry, the government constructed, staffed, and provisioned schools, hospitals, and clinics in the rural areas at a rate unprecedented in the history of the territory. And, of greater relevance to this study, it initiated programs designed to enhance the cash-earning opportunities of the villagers. Toward this end, the new government sponsored the growth of farming cooperatives and the formation of peasant farms in

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the rural areas, seeking thereby to share the benefits of independence by increasing the incomes of its rural citizens.

The Village Setting

In this essay, we analyze the experience of one village group -- called Kasumpa village -- and the response of its residents to the government's rural development program. Kasumpa village is located in the Luapula Province of Zambia, and lies some two miles inland from the Luapula River which forms the boundary between Zambia and the Katanga Province of Zaire. Like many of the villages in the Luapula valley, the village was settled by immigrants. In the case of Kasumpa, the immigrants were Bemba who had been recruited into the valley by Mwata Kazembe, the chief of the Lunda, the dominant ethnic group of the area. By recruiting Bemba warriors, Mwata sought to fortify his Lunda kingdom against the encroachments of marauding slave traders. From the late nineteenth century until the early 1900's, the Bemba warriors remained in the valley virtually as guests of the Lunda chief; they paid fealty to their own chief, Mwabamukupa, rather than being subjugated directly to the Lunda kingship. With the establishment of the Pax Britannica, however, slave raiding abated and with it, need for protection. Mwata Kazembe was therefore willing to risk the disaffection of his former military defenders, and so he displaced Mwabamukupa, the chief of the Bemba, and appointed a Lunda to govern the Bemba community. The headman's name was Kasumpa, and as is the custom in Central Africa, the village took his name.

Kasumpa Village numbers approximately 500 households. These households run in a line along what was formerly the main road between the district capital of Kawambwa and the road along the floor

of the Luapula valley. Each maintains a garden of groundnuts, pumpkins, and sometimes tobacco in the village itself; but the principal fields are maintained within one mile of the village, and concentrate along the banks of nearby streams. In these outlying fields, the villagers grow the principal staple -- cassava -- which they interplant with maize and cucurbits. The second major staple, groundnuts, they grow in adjacent fields, along with occasional patches of "European vegetables": tomatoes, cabbages, and onions. Many families also possess fruit trees, either in the village itself or bordering on the gardens outside the village.

Kasumpa lies at the intersection of two perennial streams, and the extensive "river margin" contains soils of very high quality; villagers frequently point with pride to the luxuriant grass that grows in the area as a sign of the quality of their land; agricultural ecologists have recognized these valley soils as being among the lands of greatest fertility in Zambia.¹ In working the soils, the villagers utilize a mound type of agricultural system. Late in the dry season, which runs roughly from June until October, they break the soil with hoes and work it into a series of ridges. In these they place cassava cuttings and the seeds which they have maintained from the previous year's harvests. With the onset of the rains, the villagers devote their efforts to weeding and spacing and to guarding the crops against the depredations of wild animals. They also plant vegetables at the onset of the dry season and harvest these prior to the rains. During the harvests, the villagers labor intensively to recover and store their crops and to prevent spoilage. While both men and women work in the fields, the men concentrate their labor at the beginning and the end of the agricultural cycle -- at the time of the breaking of the soils and at the time of the harvests. The women's work is more evenly distributed and centers around the building of the mounds, weeding, and harvesting as well.

The vast majority of the villagers farm in the manner which has been described. There are, however, some variants to the system. Some villagers supplement their mound gardens with chitemene gardens, in which they use ash from the branches of pollarded trees to fertilize their soils. This supplement appears to be characteristic of gardens located away from the rivers and near the forests, and is of relatively minor importance in the area. More significant is a second major variant of the prevailing agricultural system: that of cash-crop farming. Ten families from Kasumpa village have withdrawn from the village and set themselves up on farms about a mile and a half from the village; another thirty families formed into two cooperative societies and commenced producing in the same area. Both the farmers and cooperative members supplement their "traditional gardens" with commercial plots on which they grow maize, a variety of vegetables, sugar cane, and bananas. Most of the farms and both the cooperative societies started after independence and are the result of the new government's promotion of cash-crop farming in this highly fertile area.

Our interest in this essay is to explore the response of the members of Kasumpa village to the government's programs of agricultural development. Our primary thesis is that agricultural development, political protest, and rural emigration are interdependent phenomena. Thus, we contend that attempts by the government to upgrade rural income through programs of agricultural development have largely failed, and that in response to this failure, the Kasumpa villagers have participated in movements of political dissent and have sought private solutions to the problem of low rural incomes by entering the urban market for labor.

The Ecological and Cultural Setting

Our secondary thesis is that the response of the Kasumpa villagers has been largely conditioned by the ecological and cultural constraints within which they seek to enhance their standards of living. Thus, we contend, the ecological setting within which they have sought higher incomes through farming, in conformity with the government's rural development effort, has nearly guaranteed that farming would fail. Ecologically, while the area is fertile and well watered, its primary characteristic is its remoteness from the copper deposits of Zambia and thus from the major urban markets for food: Kasumpa is over 200 miles from Mufulira, the nearest copperbelt town. Urban consumers and distributors have been able to purchase produce from nearer farmers at lower cost, and so prior to the government's rural development effort, private markets for agricultural produce hardly functioned in the area of Kasumpa village; the market simply did not penetrate that far. More recently, the remoteness of the area has meant that the public agencies created as a part of the development program, rather than private markets, have shaped the operations of the farms, with the result that profits have not been made.

A second ecological characteristic of great importance is the infestation of the area with tsetse fly. The presence of the fly has seriously constrained the transformation from subsistence to peasant farming; for not only have the villagers lacked cattle for sale, but also, they have lacked the means of motive power by which to farm more extensively and a primary source of cheap fertilizers by which to farm more intensively as well. It is not by chance that the most prosperous peasant farming areas in Zambia have been those with cattle; and the history of the rise of peasant farming in the territory can be written in terms of the transformation of cattle

into farming assets by adopting manuring, forage rotations, scotch-carts, and ploughs. But in the area of Kasumpa village, the presence of tsetse has forced those who seek higher incomes through the government's sponsorship of cash-crop farming to operate without cattle, and therefore with lower acreages and lower output per farm than would otherwise be the case.

Culturally, the Kasumpa villagers have been affected by attitudes and practices which they have acquired in their previous history, and which today still influence their responses and behavior.² One set of attitudes was first generated in the nineteenth century, and derives from what can be called the villagers' "myth of origin." As we have seen, the villagers first entered the valley at the request of the Lunda and as their equals and, indeed, as their protectors; prior to the displacement of their chief in the 1920's, the villagers lacked any previous history of domination by the Lunda. An important result was that when the nationalist movement entered the valley in the 1950's, the Kasumpa villagers were at the forefront of the attacks upon the primary agency of the colonial government in the area, the Lunda Superior Native Authority; and this in turn has meant in the post-independence era that the Kasumpa villagers have high expectations of economic rewards from the government which they feel that they helped put into power. As a result of this political history, as we shall see, the relationship between the fate of the government's rural development programs and the tendency for political dissent is closely drawn in the case of this village grouping.

A second cultural "residue" that influences the response of the Kasumpa villagers is their long history of urban exposure. From the time of the opening of the Katanga mines in the first decade of the twentieth century, Kasumpa villagers have journeyed forth in search of employment. When the villagers now speak of

gaining an income, they are often describing an economic situation in which they are working for someone else and thereby drawing regular, predictable, and immediate economic rewards for their labor, analagous to the monthly wages which they derived from urban employment. This "traditional" orientation toward earning a living has, as we shall see, strongly affected their response to the opportunities created by the government's cooperative program.

A third major element in the cultural heritage of the villagers -- and the last of major importance to this essay -- is the extended family. As we shall see, in attempting to cope with rural impoverishment, the villagers utilize their network of kin relations as a means of extracting wealth from the urban sector, and in this manner seek a private solution to the failure of public programs to generate earnings in the rural sector.

With these theses in mind, we can now turn to the substance of this study. We begin with an analysis of the major, alternative sources of rural income in Kasumpa village. These include political work in the governing party, membership in the cooperatives, and work on the farms. We analyze the reasons for the impoverishment of these governmentally sponsored alternatives. And we then move on to examine the response of the villagers to their failure to generate significantly enhanced economic returns.³

II. INCOME OPPORTUNITIES SPONSORED BY THE PUBLIC SECTOR

The Political Party

At first glance, it may appear strange to regard political work as a significant source of income. But, an analysis of the origins and history of the nationalist movement in the Luapula valley strongly suggests that people entered political activity and supported the indigenous political parties in an attempt to enhance their economic standing. The commitment to political activity was a strong one. The Luapula valley was an area in which political organizers transformed nationalist protest into insurgency, and only by importing mobile police and armed forces from the urban areas did the colonial authorities curtail the violence which broke out in the area in the early 1960's. What was the motivation for this impassioned support of the nationalist movement?

There were, of course, many reasons. The people were in rebellion against the misuse of power by the chiefs; this was important, and particularly in Kasumpa village where the authority of the Lunda chiefs, as we have seen, was established only recently and, even then, without extinguishing the historical loyalties to the Bemba prince that had led his warriors into the area. Another reason was the genuine and profound hatred of foreign rule. The people wanted to be free of foreign domination and were grieved and angry at finding themselves in what they experienced as a position of slavery. But there were other reasons for their support of the nationalist movement, and these were economic in nature.

A fundamentally economic reason was the hatred of taxes. More than perhaps anything else in the rural areas, the nationalist movement was a rebellion against having to pay levies to the government.

Each year every person judged to be over eighteen had to pay a head tax to the colonial government. The tax in many ways was inequitable. It was as great for those with families as it was for single men; and those with jobs and a steady source of cash income paid the same taxes as those who were living as subsistence cultivators. The native authority levied further taxes -- for bicycle licences, dog licenses, hunting permits and permits for brewing beer. And the public officials also levied fines -- for improper thatch on houses, for failing to build drying racks to keep household utensils off the ground, and for failing to dig latrines to the specified depths, for example. The hatred of public levies is perhaps best captured in the following narrative of a senior resident of Kasumpa village.

First the messengers of the chief came to our village and told us the day that the District Commissioner would come to inspect the village and to collect the taxes. All the people of the village were to be in the village on that day. They were not to go to their fields. They were to wash themselves and their clothes for that day and they were to learn songs. Then the District Commissioner would come. He would camp near the village; his messengers would use a house in the village, and the people would have to sleep elsewhere. His messengers would take him eggs and chickens from the village, and the owners would be paid a very small price, even though he was paid a salary by the government.

When the District Commissioner at last entered the village, we would form lines. We would clap and cheer and sing what his messengers had said was his favorite song. We put on our happy faces. Then the District Commissioner would come pushing his bicycle and he would wave as if he were happy to see us, but letting us know that he was only seeming to be so as he was our superior.

Then he would put up a shelter and take the personal levy. If we did not pay it, we went to jail. Then he inspected the houses and the latrines and saw if there were drying racks to keep the dishes off the ground. If there was poor thatch, pah!, you paid a five shilling fine. A poor latrine, pah!, five shillings. The fines and the taxes continued, even though you may have no work.

During all this, we had to stand. We feared if our children cried. **It was** forbidden to sit until you were told to do so. Then, you **had** to sit. One man from the town was here with a new suit on. **He** refused to sit on the ground because his suit was clean. The **District** Commissioner shouted at him for being insolent. The **messengers** made him carry the District Commissioner's tent on his tour for the next two weeks, even though he had only five weeks leave in the village to visit with his family.

The villagers simply hated being coerced into making payments to the government. Adding to the problem was that the residents were convinced that the services they received from the government did not adequately compensate them for the income which they contributed for its maintenance. Law and order under foreign rule was simply not worth the price. Significantly, the villagers marked the highpoint of the nationalist rebellion by burning their tax booklets; and they did this just prior to banding into small bands of guerilla fighters and commencing the violent struggle against the colonial regime.

The second economic reason for supporting the nationalist movement was that the people expected material benefits from their support of the nationalist cause. The leaders of the movement expected promotions and jobs; for many, their objective was to hold public posts, with the salaries, offices, and perquisites which they knew were given to those who held positions in government. The followers expected that by putting their own leaders in positions of power, they would secure benefits from them. The politicians, of course, played upon these beliefs in order to secure power. They promised that there would be schemes in the rural areas -- farming schemes, cooperative schemes, goat schemes, and schemes for marketing the oranges, bananas, and mangoes that grew in the area. They promised that they would bring industries to the rural areas and that there would be widespread employment. A cannery would tin the fish from the nearby rivers and the fruits from the banana and mango trees. Surely the soils of the Luapula

contained the same minerals that had made the copperbelt rich, and, after independence, these would be explored, developed, and worked. In the press and the bulletins issued by the nationalist politicians, and still kept in the houses of many Kasumpa villagers, the politicians urged the people to feel that given independence, the copperbelt would come to them instead of their having to go to the copperbelt. The people therefore felt that by supporting the nationalist movement, through votes, financial contributions, and physical suffering in the acts of violence that characterized political protest in this area, they could secure higher incomes with the coming of independence.⁴

For the leaders, the nationalist movement did pay. One former party leader is now a district governor in the Ministry of National Guidance. Another became an assistant district secretary in Mporokoso, and a third holds the same office in Samfya. In response to postindependence circulars which asked for the names of party leaders who merited rewards for their labors, other party officials were offered jobs in the government marketing agency; two now serve as security guards in the mechanical workshops in the district capital; and three others were given training and then employment as drivers of government vehicles. Most party leaders, however, remained in the village after independence. One served as a councillor in the Kawambwa Rural Council; there he partook in the veritable pillage of the council treasury that led to the suspension of council activities within two years after independence. And others organized into farming cooperatives. Using their positions of political influence, they secured certificates of registration and literally thousands of kwacha in loans. Following independence, the nationalist movement took care of its own.

But for the present party leaders, the era of promotions and payoffs has passed. Those who fought the fight for freedom sought rewards for their sacrifices, and they got them. But the present set

of leaders can expect no benefits of that kind. For those who see political work as a means for enhancing their material interests, the party is now a disappointing venture.

The Cooperative Societies

The farming cooperatives are the second publicly supported source of rural income. The Zambian government formed the cooperatives, at least in part, as a means of rewarding the rural dwellers for their sacrifices in the nationalist struggle. The government announced the cooperative program at the first mass meeting between the rank and file party workers and the cabinet officials of the new government which they had helped to place in power. At the meeting, the President declared:

The money is there and the know-how is there. You can form these cooperative societies anywhere in Zambia and we shall assist you in getting on.⁵

The party workers returned from this meeting to the villages and spread the news of the new government's program. In Zambia as a whole, the number of cooperatives doubled in two years and quadrupled in four.⁶ In Kasumpa village, the number rose from none to two, and the membership from none to thirty. And in Kasumpa as elsewhere in Zambia, it was the local leadership of the nationalist movement that took the initiative in organizing, registering, and leading the farming cooperative, and thereby in realizing the benefits of independence.

TABLE 1

Relationship Between Party Office-Holding and Office-Holding in the Cooperatives

	<u>Office Holding in Cooperatives</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Does Not Apply</u>	
<u>Office Holding in Party</u>				
Main body	4	17	3	24
Youth	0	8	2	10
Constituency	3	1	0	4
No Office	6	47	14	67
Total	13	73	19	105

Chi Square = 15.69

Degrees of freedom = 6.00

Significance = .02

The government took several measures to underpin the cooperative societies. For one, it sought to provide the technical skills which were lacked by the subsistence producers. Thus, it provided training for the leadership of the cooperative societies in matters of management -- e.g., in record keeping and accounting -- and in directly productive skills -- planting, the application of fertilizers, and pest control. And it staffed the rural areas with extension workers: agricultural officers, who assisted the cooperative societies by advising them on farm methods, and cooperative officers, who advised the societies concerning their internal management and informed them about services provided by other departments. Secondly, the government sought to offset the lack of productive power available to village producers by purchasing and distributing mechanical equipment. Thus, it distributed literally scores of tractors following independence, and stationed them at central depots in the rural districts. In Kawambwa district alone, whereas there had been but three tractors prior to 1964, within two years after independence, there were over twenty.⁷ And the members of the cooperative societies now had, for the first time, the possibility of utilizing methods of cultivation other than the hoe.

In two other ways, the government sought to promote the cooperative societies. First, it generated the funds through which the members could capitalize their farming efforts. Thus, through capital provided by the Department of Co-operatives, and through loans made available by the Credit Organization of Zambia, the cooperative societies could hire laborers to clear new acreages (through stumping subsidies), maintain themselves and their families until the first crops were produced on the newly opened lands (through maintenance allowances),

and purchase the inputs necessary to commence production (through seasonal loans for the purchase of seeds and fertilizers and the hiring of tractor services). Lastly, the government sought to enhance the likelihood of the success of the cooperatives by creating a marketing service. Opening up small depots in the rural areas, and hiring staff and transport, the government sought to generate for the first time a large-scale demand for the output of village-level producers and to market the agricultural requisites which village farmers demanded. Through all of these measures, the government hoped to insure that the cooperative societies would yield financial rewards and upgrade the standard of living of the village dwellers.

In Kasumpa village, as elsewhere throughout much of rural Zambia, the cooperatives have failed. Using yields to assess their performance, the Kasumpa cooperatives achieved an average yield of 5.0 standard bags of maize per acre in 1971, in comparison with a national average for commercial farmers of approximately 20 bags per acre and a national average for subsistence producers around 5.1 bags.⁸ Similar differences arise in the case of groundnuts and vegetables. Applying financial measures to assess performance of the cooperatives yields an equally dismal assessment, for both cooperatives ran at a loss; the best measure of their losses is the extent of their indebtedness, for the generous loans advanced by the government shortly after independence have now become a massive loan debt to the cooperative societies. Lastly, in 1972, the cooperatives simply ceased to function. Selling their farming requisites, the cooperatives have refused to plant and are now slated for "winding up" by the government.

Even though we can be skeptical as to whether the cooperative form of agricultural production could work in any case, this was not the basic reason for the failure of cooperative farming in Kasumpa.

Rather, two major reasons stand out. For one, the remoteness of Kasumpa village from major urban markets -- for capital, farming requisites, mechanical services, and transport -- meant that the operations of the cooperatives were dependent upon the performance of governmental bureaucracies, and these proved unreliable. And for another, the cooperative farmers defined their role as that of laborers in a governmental enterprise. They worked so as to achieve short-term, regular rewards; and their motivations led them first to misallocate their resources and then to turn away from cooperative farming altogether.

The Effect of Remoteness

Being remote from the urban areas, with their relative abundance of farm suppliers, credit institutions, transporters, and distributors, the cooperative societies in Kasumpa village depended entirely upon the governmental institutions for their farming needs. In order to operate successfully, the cooperatives had repeatedly to pass through a sequence of bureaucratic hurdles. First, they had to secure loans from the government's credit organization so that they could purchase seeds and fertilizers and hire the tractor services. Once approved, the loan certificates had to be presented to the marketing agency so as to vouch for the payment of agricultural supplies. The key was to get the loan certificate early enough in the agricultural season so that the marketing agency could order enough of an inventory to provision the local cooperatives and do so in time to distribute its supplies prior to the onset of the rains. Equally as important, the loans had to be approved early enough in the season so that the cooperative societies could rent tractor services in time to complete tilling and planting before the rains began.

Being bureaucracies, the major governmental departments did not have to compete nor did they particularly care about making a profit; even when enjoined by statute to be self-financing, the agencies

could always -- and did frequently -- turn to the public treasury as the source of their revenues. Lacking competition and the need to make a profit, the credit agency therefore had little incentive to get its loans out in time; the marketing agency had no financial incentive to make timely, or correct, deliveries for seeds or fertilizers; and the tractor drivers could arrive as much as two months late without fear that the cooperative farmers would have taken recourse to alternative providers of tractor services. The result was that the provisioning of credit, goods, and services took place in a manner that was devastating to the cooperatives. For example, in the 1970-71 farm season, one cooperative had its loan approved in October and the other in mid-November. The rains began by mid-November, and this meant that the fields were unploughed at the time of the onset of the rains. While the seeds and fertilizers arrived on December 10, the tractor did not arrive until January 8. Even then, the tractor ran short of fuel and failed to complete ploughing the acreage for which it had been contracted. The result for one cooperative was that of the 50 acres which it had planned to plant, it in fact planted 7; and of the K165 that was realized from the sale of produce, K50.48 was applied to interest and the remainder to principle of an outstanding loan debt of K3105.⁹ The farmers were left with nothing for their efforts. While I was unable to get accurate figures for the other cooperative, the impression was vividly left that for them, the situation was the same.

The Effects of Motivation

Adding to the downfall of the cooperative societies was the motivation of its members. The members sought immediate, short-term rewards for their work in the cooperatives. There were two major

reasons for this. For one, they regarded the cooperatives as economic rewards for the time, pain, and effort which they had devoted to the movement of national liberation, and they wanted their rewards in immediate and tangible form. For another, the members' image of an economic relationship was one based upon their experiences in town. Rather than aspiring to being economically self-sustaining, they aspired to the status of paid employees. And rather than future profits, they wanted present income. These motivations occasioned a series of decisions which disrupted cooperative farming.

One consequence of their motivations was that the cooperative members expended time and effort on activities which yielded immediate benefits, regardless of their long-term consequences for profits. Thus, for example, the government paid a subsidy of K30 per acre for stumping new lands. As a result, both cooperatives chose to locate in the forested areas, where they could clear new lands and receive the subsidy, rather than on the river margins, where the land required no clearing but did possess superior soils and an abundant supply of water. In addition, rather than growing produce, the cooperatives continued to clear new acreage: one, for example, by 1972 had cleared 100 acres, while planting only 15, inspiring one cooperative officer to write: "They should have a farm of crops, not grass."¹⁰

In addition, the members of the cooperative societies applied immense pressure upon the government to release their loan money, not so as to invest in supplies and farm requisites, but rather to pay them "for their labor." Thus, for example, the chairman of one of the two cooperatives wrote a local government official saying that the members had threatened him, telling him that "If you are not going to pay us, we shall go to the court of law to report or summon you." The chairman went on to write that he could no longer "sleep in his house" but rather "sleeps in the jungle for . . . fear of being attacked

during the night time."¹¹ In later days, he joined his members in their demands for a cash payout of their loan money, writing:

We are demanding money for our fields and many people have run away from the co-operatives because of lacking money. They are saying that we shall come back when we receive money for the field. That is why we shall go to the office to look for money. . . . One part for weeding and one part to buy our food. . . . The other money will be shared among ourselves to buy clothes. There can not be a job without any wages.¹²

The pressure for money became so intense that in 1972 the chairman, rather than using the farm supplies for growing, actually sold the seed and fertilizer, claiming that the proceeds represented "the rewards for independence." Needless to say, following the sale, the members of the cooperative did not plant, save subsistence gardens.

Stumping, rather than planting; taking their loans in the form of "wages," rather than capital goods; and converting farm assets into spendable cash -- all these decisions led to higher present income, but were detrimental to the establishment of the cooperatives as independent, self-sustaining production units. The downfall of the cooperatives came when the government decided to credit the sale of goods by the cooperatives toward the repayment of their loan debt. The result was that the credit agency, rather than the members, received the money from the crop sales, and that the cooperative members therefore literally received no money from the marketing of their harvests. As a result, they refused to plant. They now see themselves as "on strike" against the government, and as resisting the government's attempts to "make us into slaves who work without being paid," in the words of one member. As another went on to say:

We were warriors and we were freedom fighters. We shall never be any person's slave. We fought against even Mwata when he took money from us. We chased the British. And we will fight any government which tries to make us poor.

While not slaves, neither are they cash-crop farmers. The attempt by the government to generate rural incomes by establishing cooperative societies in Kasumpa village has failed.

The Farmers

Ten of the villagers had turned to farming. Four had been farmers in the preindependence period; six entered production in 1965, the year after independence in Zambia. They did so because they had heard that the new government was going to support farming in the rural areas and that they could earn money through agricultural production. They, too, have been disappointed. And much of the blame for their failure they attribute to the government.

While the cooperatives had ceased production in 1971, the farms continued to plant; and this enabled a closer assessment of the actual functioning of the farms. In general, inspection revealed that their operations were such that farming could not generate significant rural incomes; and the performance of the governmental bureaucracies almost ensured that it could not.

As we have argued, the primary ecological attributes affecting cash-crop production in Kasumpa are its remoteness from the urban markets and the presence of tsetse fly. Remoteness, we argued, has caused farm operations to depend overwhelmingly on the performance of governmental bureaucracies; while created to offset the absence of significant markets in the rural areas, these bureaucracies operated in a way that failed to generate profits. The second attribute -- the presence of tsetse fly -- has meant that, in the absence of tractor power, farming is done on small acreages. Both ecological factors conspire to undermine the profitability of farming.

In the absence of competitive private markets, the independent farmers, in purchasing inputs and marketing produce, confront the same set of bureaucratic hurdles as did the cooperative societies. But, while the cooperatives had access to loan money from the department of cooperatives itself, the independent farmers could secure loan funds only from the government's credit agency. To secure these loans, the farmers had first to receive the backing of the agricultural extension worker. And in order to gain his recommendation, the farmers had to follow his advice. Only by so doing would the extension agent promote the farmer's loan application by certifying that the farmer is "an eager learner" and one who follows "approved farming practices."

To secure loans, the farmers must therefore plant in time; they must space and thin their crops properly; they must use the recommended fertilizers and pesticides, and do so in the approved amounts. But above all, the farmers must grow maize. For the agricultural extension worker has been instructed that for new farmers in remote areas, maize is the best crop to grow. Of the available crops, maize is the least complex to cultivate, and so can be easily grown by inexperienced farmers; and it is easily stored and transported, and so can be grown in areas distant from consumer markets. And besides, the agricultural department is responsible in governmental circles for protecting Zambia's balance of payments by reducing maize imports, and so has made increased maize production a primary administrative target. Extension workers, eager for promotion, therefore encourage maize production.

The trouble is that the price of maize is low; without high yields, in the range of 12 to 15 bags an acre at the prevailing prices in 1972, maize is simply not very profitable on small acreages.¹³ The mean acreage worked by the Kasumpa farmers is small, however (4.36 acres; 1.16 acres standard deviation) and so the farmers, in order to finance their enterprises, are being constrained by bureaucratic practices to farm unprofitably.

The principle reasons for the small acreages are again the remoteness of the farms and the presence of tsetse fly. As we indicated, after independence, the government distributed 23 tractors in Kawambwa district to promote farming in the area; by the end of 1971, however, less than half were working, and even these tended to arrive at the farms late and fail to plough on time. In the remote districts, distant from mechanical workshops, supplies of parts, and pools of trained artisans, it was nearly impossible to keep the tractor fleet in operation; and in distant areas, where the supplying of tractor services did not take place through competitive markets, it was almost impossible to properly allocate these services to farmers. The result was that most farmers lacked mechanical ploughing, and their acreages were small. Nor, because of the absence of cattle, could the farmers extend their acreages through animal power. Rather, they had to use hoes, and this meant that they worked four to five acres.

In 1972, the Kasumpa farmers achieved an average yield of 9.11 bags of maize per acre. By growing groundnuts, which sold at half again the price of maize, bananas, and vegetables (tomatoes, beans, onions, and cabbage), they managed to increase their earnings to an average total of K125.80. Assuming that they worked an average of 57.90 man days per acre -- which is what the average farmer worked, according to the government's research in the area¹⁴ -- this in effect meant that the farmers could have done as well by undertaking the lowest paid form of labor in Zambia -- agricultural labor, at 50 ngwee a day. In effect, had they worked for other farmers rather than farming themselves, their income would have been the same.

The farmers are aware that their earnings are small and that the size of their earnings is limited by the low value of their principal product. As a result, they have attempted to shift production from maize to bananas and vegetables. For comparable acreages, given relative prices, bananas and vegetables can yield greater

profits than maize. But two major factors have limited the ability of the farmers to adjust their production to the relative profitability of these commodities. For one, the farmers were constantly pressured by the extension agents, who continued to require inflated maize targets as a condition for seasonal loans. And, for another, the alternative crops to maize are highly perishable, and so had to be marketed locally to villagers and to neighboring institutions -- a hospital and secondary school. In marketing locally, the farmers confronted several problems. They found that they had little control over the local market and so were vulnerable to the entrance of new suppliers. In the case of tomatoes, for example, the villagers have learned to grow them and the farmers have lost both the village market and a portion of the market at the local institutions. Moreover, the institutions increasingly contracted with bulk suppliers. For example, they purchased bulk deliveries from a large, government-sponsored vegetable scheme in the district capital. Bulk purchases simplified their purchasing and got reduced prices. Moreover, the large-scale producers provided their own transport -- something the village farmers could not do -- and the institutions saved in transport costs as well.

The farmers therefore had a difficult time in shifting production into higher priced commodities. One result, as we have seen, was low earnings. Another was indebtedness. Like the cooperatives, the farmers were going into debt. Their earnings simply were not sufficient to pay back the loans which they did secure, with the result that, on average, they now owed K493.33 to the government, or the equivalent to the value of four seasons' annual production at 1972 levels and prices. As with the cooperatives, the government has now begun to credit to its loan agency the proceeds of the farmers' sales to its marketing organization; the farmers receive nothing from these sales. In addition, as the following letter makes clear, the government

intends to collect its debts:

13 December 1971

To all Farmers . . . :

Farmers who have sold . . . bring your money here. You know that you have credit . . . ; so that's why I ask you to bring your money. If you have not given this money, I will ask the government to help us in selling your goods: gardens, houses, and even your live stocks.

Supervisor in Charge
Agricultural Finance Company, Ltd.
Nchelenge District

The farmers are not making substantial profits; indeed, they have run up substantial debts, and the government is beginning to recover these debts from the farmers. Peasant farming, like work in the party and cooperative farming, does not generate substantial economic rewards. The attempts by the public sector to promote the incomes of the village residents failed to bear fruit in Kasumpa village. We now turn to a discussion of the response of the villagers to this failure.

III THE RESPONSE OF THE VILLAGERS TO THE FAILURE OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The Political Response

One response has been political apathy. This response characterizes some of the former leaders of the nationalist movement who have failed to derive significant benefits from their political labors and now have shifted their efforts elsewhere. An example of this is a former chairman of one of the local party branches, who in 1970 resigned the post which he had held since the mid-1950's.

"I was fed up," he stated, "we were getting nowhere. Many others in the organization had got jobs, and I was just sitting idle. For me, it had been of no worth."

Politics, for him, had not paid off. He no longer works at politics, but instead makes and sells baskets, helps build roofs on village houses, and fashions window and door frames, using the skills he acquired as a young labor migrant in the city. Not only is this man apathetic, however; he is also resentful. Speaking of the members of parliament whom he had helped put into power, he comments:

The only reason any member of parliament comes here is to make campaigns. Other times, they are enjoying themselves with the money we got them. They are eating well; they have big cars. These are from America, and when someone is in it, we can't see him and he just looks blue. If they see a person walking or on a bicycle, they just chase them off the road and cover him with dust. When a man is fighting for a position, he cooperates with other people. Once in that position, then he is no good. Come time for elections, though, and they will come promising things.

The resentment expressed by the former branch chairman is widespread in Kasumpa. Frequently it transforms into protest, as the villagers

attempt to alter the behavior of the public officials upon whom so much of their welfare depends. Most often, the villagers register their resentment when officials enter the village to inspect ongoing programs, to announce new public policies, or to engage in periodic meetings with the village headman and party officials. Thus, for example, in 1971, the president of the Republic appointed a new district governor; upon taking up his new post, the governor sought to familiarize himself with the villages in his area. He received a hostile reception in Kasumpa. Why, he was asked, had ploughing again failed? Why had the loans been late? Did he not see how the young men had left the villages for town; and did he not realize had the farmers been made rich, these men could then have worked at home? In particular, the villagers criticized the local extension agent, whom they blamed for the general failure of cooperative and peasant farming; and the new district head, to recoup his standing, had the agent transferred. He also initiated a "commission of inquiry" into the conduct of the credit and marketing organizations -- a move that was widely acclaimed.

In addition to subjecting public officials to verbal abuse -- something that has earned Kasumpa village considerable notoriety in governmental circles -- the villagers also protest through the use of votes. As the quotation from the former branch chairman suggests, the villagers are aware that they possess a valuable resource -- their electoral support -- which they can exchange for the attention and services of elected officials. Twice they have acted on this realization. In the local council elections after independence, for example, they threatened to stay away from the polls in protest over the location of a road. One of the first programs the government undertook after independence was the building of a road along the floor of the Luapula Valley, named "Zambia Highway." The villagers discovered that the government planned to locate the road several miles from Kasumpa

so as to cross the neighboring streams above the swamps near Kasumpa; the villagers realized that the new road would therefore not improve their access to the hospital and secondary school which lay across the swamps, and so would be of little benefit to them. They therefore petitioned to have the road re-sited. And they adopted a new political slogan, "no road, no vote," and threatened to withhold support from government candidates in the upcoming elections. The government was compelled to alter its plans and to construct a causeway so that the road could cross the swamps.

Equally as serious was the attempt by several Kasumpa villagers in 1972 to affiliate with the United Political Party (UPP), an opposition party formed by the former national Vice President, Simon Kapwepwe. A small group of village party leaders (who held top positions in one of the cooperative societies) made contact with UPP officials on the copperbelt. They secured propaganda leaflets and membership cards and began to proselytize on behalf of the party. As one of them stated:

The present government regards us as goats who can just eat the grass. We are suffering. During the struggle they promised us that there would be no more poor people and that we would be rich. It is seven years and we are still poor.

Citing in particular the failure of the cooperative societies, he went on to say: "It is now the same as the colonial government. We must turn out the government. Even if we fail, they will have to try to make us happy. Otherwise others will follow us and they will lose power." Before they could organize their party, the local leaders heard of the banning of UPP and the arrest of many of its officials. Their contacts in town, they learned, were in jail; they feared to carry on their efforts lest they too be imprisoned. Nonetheless, by threatening electoral opposition, they had registered their displeasure

at the failure of public institutions to upgrade their well-being and had attempted to elicit more attention and better performance from the government.

Electoral opposition and vocal protest were but two of the political techniques used by the villagers. They also contributed to the establishment and maintenance of the primary form of rural dissent in Zambia: provincialism in politics. Thus, for example, the village party officials subscribed -- literally -- to the following declaration, issued by the regional body of the governing party:

The owners of this province suffered a lot in getting independence. Many suffered, many went to prison, many died. Since independence the government has done nothing in this province. . . . Before independence we were united together with other provinces, but since then other provinces have wanted the lion's share and to eat off the heads of their friends. . . . In Northern Province, government has established a railway line, . . . and so we want mines in Luapula Province.¹⁵

In addition to mines, the politicians also demanded the radical upgrading of road links with the Copperbelt, the more rapid releasing of loans, and the construction of food processing plants so as to guarantee a demand for agricultural production in the area and so as to generate employment.¹⁶

In addition to demanding greater allocations, the local politicians also sought the devolution of financial and bureaucratic authority to the provincial level. This was particularly clear in the case of the allocation of credit, where the local politicians sought to make the local credit officials accountable to the district authorities rather than to their superiors in Lusaka¹⁷ and in the case of the allocation of finances, where they demanded that their provincial leaders have the power to authorize and spend funds for projects which were located in their area. By concentrating resources and authority at the local level, the villagers hoped that they could make the public agencies more

responsive to their needs. As one provincial politician stated,

Our government has told us about decentralization . . . so as to bring the government near to the people and have their problems dealt with on the spot. But yet this has not been a practice at all. Although we have a Provincial Cabinet Minister and Permanent Secretaries in the Provinces, still matters are referred to Lusaka for final approval, just as it was in the past.¹⁸

The lack of decentralization affects the villagers directly. Thus, when they demanded a better feeder road to their farms, they failed to get it because the Ministry of Agriculture in Lusaka had lost the papers authorizing the release of funds for the project; had the provincial authorities their own money, the villagers believed, the road could have been taken care of. Also, when many of the villagers had labored on a project at the hospital, they had had to wait for over five months for their pay; the checks had first to be cleared with the central ministries, and no one locally had funds, or the power to divert funds, to pay the workers. A similar delay was encountered in seeking compensation for the houses which were destroyed when building the road through the village.

The local villagers want the government to make greater allocations for their area. They want local officials to have greater resources and the authority to distribute them. By securing these things, they feel, the government will be made more responsive to their needs. In making these demands the Kasumpa villagers helped to lay the foundations for provincialism in Zambia. Provincialism is at least in part a response by rural dwellers to the failure by government to generate increased standards of rural well-being.

The response of the Kasumpa villagers to the failure of the rural development effort is thus political in character. Given the past history of the villagers -- their level of involvement in the nationalist movement and of their expectations for economic rewards -- it is not surprising

that so much of their reaction should take a political form.

In addition, given that the government is the prime mover of their local economy, it is also not surprising that the villagers should exert political pressure to secure their economic ends.

The Kasumpa villagers respond in another way, however.

In addition to public action, they also utilize private means; and rather than seeking political solutions to the problem of low incomes, they seek to enhance their well-being through the economic marketplace. The market they enter is the urban market for labor; and they do so by migrating to the cities.

The Response of Migration

Migration to the cities has long taken place from the Luapula Valley. The opportunities for migration are proximate and remunerative: the mining areas of the former Katanga Province of Zaire and the rich copper mines of the copperbelt in Zambia. The opportunities for urban employment first came in Katanga, where the mines opened in the early 1900's; later, in the 1920's and early 1930's, Zambia's mines came into production. In response to the creation of these urban markets for labor, many men migrated. Of the 105 heads of households that I drew into my sample survey of Kasumpa Village, 86 or 81.9 percent had at one time or another migrated to town. Those who had migrated had average approximately two trips each and had remained in town for an average of 11.7 years. As can be seen from Table 2, there was a strong tendency for those who first migrated in the early 1900's to have concentrated in the Zairian labor market; while those who first migrated in the 1930's or later tended to have journeyed to Zambian employment centers. Urban migration has thus been a pervasive and persistent aspect of rural life in Kasumpa.

TABLE 2

Place of Migration by Date of First Migration

	Pre- 1920	1920- 1929	1930- 1939	1940- 1949	1950-
Exclusively or Primarily to Zaire N	3	8	2	2	2
Percent Total	37.5	40.0	10.5	11.7	9.5
Equally to Zaire and to Zambia N	1	0	1	0	0
Percent Total	12.5	0.0	5.2	0.0	0.0
Exclusively or Primarily to Zambia N	4	12	16	15	19
Percent Total	50.0	60.0	84.2	88.2	90.5
TOTAL	8	20	19	17	21

The motivations for migration to town are straightforward: the desire for jobs and money. Thus, when asked what they liked most about town, the sample of Kasumpa heads of households gave the following replies:

TABLE 3

Answers to the Question: What Do You Like Most About Living in Town?

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Like town because:		
Jobs and Money	48	45.7
Can get money with more leisure	4	3.8
High Standard of living (e. g., more stores, more conveniences, etc.)	10	9.5
Can Stay with children there	3	2.8
No jealousy of wealth there	2	1.9
Don't like town, because:		
Too old to work in town	2	1.9
Without a job, cannot live there	1	0.9
No Opinion/No experience in town recently	35	33.3
 TOTAL	 105	 99.8

Forty-six percent cited the availability of employment and earnings as the most attractive aspects of urban life, while the answers of nearly two thirds noted basically economic factors as the most attractive qualities of town.

People in Kasumpa, for decades, have thus gone to town for economic reasons; and, given the rate of development that has taken place in the towns of Zambia since the time of independence, it is not

surprising that many continue to migrate from the village. Contributing to the level of migration from Kasumpa has been the failure of public programs to enhance the levels of village incomes. The villagers have seen the failure of the cooperatives, the indebtedness of the farmers, and the end of the era in which it in fact paid to belong to the nationalist party. They know that there are few income opportunities in the village. And so they seek through the labor market to deploy their efforts to the more productive sector of the national economy, and thereby secure higher incomes. Thus, as one young man stated prior to leaving for town: "I am happy in the village; only, there is no employment here. The government should have given money so that we could find ways to support ourselves." And, as recorded in my notes of a discussion with several young men of the village, all of whom planned to migrate:

- - - - - said: "My parents have not enough money to feed themselves . . . and I know that my brothers in Ndola and Lusaka, who have jobs, can provide. . . . And so I am leaving. My parents consent to this."

- - - - - said: "I see no profit here. The work is very hard. The people have a low standard of living. There is no industry to provide jobs and farming yields no profit."

His friends joined him at this point, saying that even his father's elder brother . . . who works hard as a farmer is still living poorly. "We would prefer to stay," they said, "but then, there is no money here."

Urban migration is not merely an escape from the rural to the urban centers, however. It is an important source of rural income as well. Rural dwellers benefit from the placement of children and relatives in urban employment; for they can utilize the family network to extract resources from their family members abroad in the city. Illustrative of this is that the members of my sample of 105 heads of households in Kasumpa village reported receiving an average of K20.23 in money payments from their children in town during the previous year; not included

in this total is the value of gifts in kind, such as household wares, food, and clothing. From their sib and the sib of their wives who were abroad in town, the heads of households reported receiving, on average, an additional K9.40 in cash. Again, the figure does not include the value of gifts in kind, and so is an underestimate of the level of payments received from urban kinship sources.

The Kasumpa villagers utilize urban migrants to increase their level of well-being. To demonstrate this, we can relate the levels of remittances received by the heads of households over the last year to two measures of well-being. The first is an index of the physical characteristics of the villagers' homes. Some homes contained an armchair with stuffed cushions, a table with a cloth on it, and photographs or calendars on the wall; some even had an iron roof or windows with glass. The presence or absence of these items allows us to construct what we call a household score. Our second index of well-being is based upon the durable goods possessed by the heads of household; we label this the ownership score. The ownership score is based upon the possession, or lack of it, of a radio, a bicycle, or a sewing machine.

The significance of cash remittances for the well-being of the villagers can be inferred from the significance of the relationship between the values of these two indices and the level of remittances received from town.

[Table 4 here]

TABLE 4

Correlation Between Remittances and Indices of Well-being

	Value of Remittances From Children	Value of Remittances From Sib
Household Score		
Correlation coefficient	.2583	.3319
Number of cases	105	105
Level of significance	.004	.001
Ownership Score		
Correlation coefficient	.1899	.1677
Number of cases	105	105
Level of significance	.026	.044

The correlations between the value of the remittances from children and the sib, and the household index of well-being are both significant beyond the .01 level; the levels of significance for the correlations between the levels of remittances and the ownership score are less impressive, but both are significant at the .05 level and the relationships do run in the "right" direction -- i.e. increases in the level of remittances are associated with increases in the measure of well-being.

The importance of urban migration for the level of rural well-being is also suggested by the relationship between various measures of the level of migration from the sampled households and the values of the household index for the homes of these families. We obtain the following correlation coefficients and significance levels (Table 5).

TABLE 5

Correlation Between Levels of Migration and Household Index

	No. of Live Children	No. of Live Children in Town	No. of Live Children Employed in Town	No. of Live Children in Town Remitting Gifts	Total Value of Gifts From Children in Town Last Year
Correlation coefficient	.1119	.1605	.1869	.2011	.2553
Number of cases	105	105	105	105	105
Level of significance	.256	.102	.056	.040	.009

In Kasumpa village, some heads of household take advantage of urban migration to a greater extent than do others. The primary determinant of the difference appears to be the social stage of life of the sampled head of household. Thus, we find that an important determinant of the difference is simply family size (Table 6).

[Table 6 here]

TABLE 6

Family Size as a Determinant of Level of Migration from Household

	Total Number Live Children in Town	Total Number Live Children Employed in Town	Total Number Live Children Making Remittances From Town
Total Number Live Children			
Correlation Coefficient	.4516	.3410	.2510
Number of Cases	105	105	105
Level of Significance	.001	.001	.005

The larger the number of children, the greater the number of children in town, the number employed in town, and the number sending back remittances. It is thus apparent that villagers with established households, and so larger numbers of children, are better able to extract resources from urban sources than are villagers who have yet to establish families.

We also find a relationship between the cash earnings of the villagers and their tendency to extract resources from urban dwelling offspring. As the following table of correlation coefficients suggests, the greater the estimated average annual cash earnings of the sampled heads of household, the fewer the number of children in town, the fewer the number of children employed in town, and the fewer the number of children making remittances.

TABLE 7

Correlation Between Levels of Migration
and Average Annual Cash Earnings

	Number of Live Children in Town	Number of Live Children Employed in Town	Number of Live Children Remitting Gifts From Town
Average Annual Cash Earnings			
Correlation Coefficient	-.1915	-.1671	-.2126
Number of Cases	91	91	91
Level of Significance	.035	.057	.022

It is, by and large, the younger men who can generate cash in the village. They are the ones who tend to help build and roof houses; who prepare extra gardens and sell the surplus crops; and who journey out to unsettled areas in search of grass and bamboo to sell as roofing materials. Their energy and strength allow them to earn money from these rural sources; and their vigor is an advantage that the older men lack. Rather, the advantage of the older men lies in their established families and the numbers of their children. For it is this resource which enables them to extract resources from the urban areas.

There is another way of looking at our findings. We have found that families which are rich, in a cash sense, are less involved in the migration process; whereas those who are rich in a "real" sense, that is in terms of their possessions, are much more involved in migration. And we have interpreted these findings in terms of the stage of life of

the heads of households, suggesting that young men just founding families are cash rich and child poor, while old men are cash poor but child rich, and therefore in receipt of gifts from town. This analysis is in keeping with the Kasumpa villagers' own understanding of their family structure and the migration process, and it suggests a process of human investment.

The Kasumpa villagers want children; they expect to spend a lot of money on their children; and they expect, in return, to be supported by their children when they reach old age. Labor migration, by which children are exported to the richer urban areas and their increased earnings then drawn upon by the older generation, is perfectly adaptable to this process of intergenerational support within the family system.

Such a view of the role of children is widely shared in Kasumpa. Many of the villagers felt they were dependent upon their children in the copperbelt. Thus, when asked about visiting town, one villager replied: "I enjoy it, as my children are well employed there. So when I visit, I get clothes." Later, when asked about what, if anything, he disliked about life in the village, he replied: "Nothing, for my children support me in many of my problems. If I had no children in the copperbelt, I would suffer. There would be no money even to raise one acre of groundnuts." In response to a later question, he averred: "I cared for my children and now they care for me." And when asked his opinion about intertribal marriage in town, he declared his opposition to it; for "when it is time for the family to go back to the rural areas, the wife and man will separate and he will lose his children." This man, like other Kasumpa villagers, clearly saw his children in town as a critical economic resource.

To win financial support from the children, however, involves a heavy cash expenditure, and for two basic reasons. For one, the children, to earn good incomes in the urban areas and thereby to become remunerative, must be well educated, and this involves expenditures for school fees and uniforms. For another, to retain the affection of

the children, the parents have to spend money on the possessions which will enable their children to lead an agreeable life in the village. As the Kasumpa people state, the social habits of the towns have entered the rural areas, and town life is expensive. Thus, the children expect to be provided with good clothes, so that they can "make a good appearance" among their friends. They expect to have pocket money so that they can buy soft drinks and sweets, and even, perhaps, bottled beer at the local groceries. They expect to have access to a bicycle and some want gramophones. Some feel they need football uniforms. And some even want, and get, separate houses, which they can paint up and furnish, and in which they study after school and entertain their friends, joining their parents at their natal home only for meals. To fulfill these expectations takes money; and the parents do try to purchase these things. For if they do not, they realize that their children may well take recourse to their network of kin and join a related family in town -- a family with the money to support them in their youth, and thereby purchase their later support in return.

To illustrate this kind of thinking, I can again quote my notes from a discussion with some young men:

They all agreed that the thing they do most is to play: football, cards, talking, and looking for girls. They say the only time they have to work is at ploughing time and then they work in the fields only for a little while. Essentially, though, they have few responsibilities and their parents appear to force no responsibilities upon them.

One lad was city bound, and he had a few interesting things to say. He said that he had made overt conditions for staying with his parents. The main one was that his parents provide the things he needs. Most important was clothes. But also, he needed money for entertainment, a bicycle, and a record player. But he saw that his parents did not have the money . . . to provide these things. . . . And so he is leaving.

The parents who lack money lose their children to urban-based kin; and only by graciously affirming their children's right to leave do the

parents have a chance of retaining their affection and love, and so their future financial support. But those parents who do have cash must spend it in order to retain the allegiance of their children and thereby their future financial support. By spending their money on the children, they can thereby convert their cash into social credit, which later can be drawn upon in order to achieve material well-being.¹⁹

Interpreting our findings in this way leads us to appreciate how the Kasumpa villagers utilize the family as a means for extracting resources from the city. Through the family and the urban market for labor, the villagers attempt to achieve private solutions to the problems of their position of disadvantage in contemporary Zambia and to the failure of public programs to significantly upgrade their standard of living.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, C. G. Trapnell, The Soils, Vegetation and Agriculture of North-Eastern Rhodesia: Report of the Ecological Survey (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1953), p. 26.
2. As everyone appears to have his own definition of the term "culture," every user of the word at least owes the reader a definition of his intended meaning. I regard culture as the predisposition by a specified set of persons to respond to a class of problems in a characteristic and consistent manner. Characteristic responses I regard as having their origins in past historical circumstances of the society and as having been learned and acquired by new entrants into that society. Thus, for example, I regard the Kasumpa villagers as being predisposed to respond to situations of deprivation through political action, and attribute this to their past history of military immigration and to their high level of nationalist involvement, and to the process of learning that has taken place since that time by subsequent members of Kasumpa village.
3. Treating these topics entails ignoring others. Thus, there was in the village a successful building cooperative; but only three villagers were directly involved with it at the time of the study, and so it was of little consequence for most villagers. Secondly, there was the fishing industry from which nearly 30 percent of the villagers either directly or indirectly derived their incomes. But the government had done little to promote or enhance this industry since independence; and we attempt to analyze here the fate of public programs. Full treatment of these subjects will be forthcoming in a later, book-length study.

4. For an intemperate set of economic pledges, see the "comprehensive list of industries which, under the existing market possibilities and resources of this province, are . . . economic propositions" issued by the Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in 1966. The politicians pledged that if persons engaged in these industries, the government would back them. The list was circulated to the branches of the nationalist party in Kasumpa, and in all the other villages of the Valley, with a note urging the branch leaders to "gather all your members and tell them about this work so that they can choose an industry to work on themselves." (Speech by the Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, to Meeting of Traders, Luapula Province, 24th April 1966, Mimeograph, contained in the local party files, Kasumpa village.)
5. Quoted in C. Stephen Lombard, The Growth of Co-operatives in Zambia 1914-1971, Zambian Paper Number 6, Institute of African Studies, University of Zambia, 1971, p. 18.
6. Republic of Zambia, Department of Co-operatives, Annual Report for the Year 1968 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1969), p. 7.
7. Provincial Co-operative Officer, Luapula Province, "Annual Report for the Year Ending 31st December 1971," mimeographed, from the files of the Provincial Co-operative Officer.
8. See the assessment of yields by the agricultural officer, as reported to the credit agency: File NE/70/S, Agricultural Finance Corporation, Nchelenge District Offices and E. de Vries, "The Importance of Traditional Agriculture in Zambia," mimeographed paper presented for the Rural and Regional Planning Committee for the Second National Development Plan, Lusaka, August 1970. See also the results of the

national survey of farming cooperatives reported in G. Olund and J. Russel, Survey of Farming Co-operatives (Lusaka: Ministry of Rural Development, 1970).

9. Statement of Balance, 31 October 1971, File NE/69, Agricultural Finance Corporation, Nchelenge District Offices.
10. Provincial Co-operative Officer to Co-operative Assistant, Kawambwa, 5 March 1970, from file Co-operative Unions, General, at District Offices, Nchelenge.
11. Chairman, Chikalamo Farming Co-operative to Farm Manager, Kawambwa, 25 April 1968, in file Co-operative Unions, General, at District Offices, Nchelenge.
12. Chairman, Chikalamo Farming Co-operative, to Co-operative Assistant, Nchelenge, 23 February 1971, in file Co-operative Unions, General, at District Offices, Nchelenge.
13. Ministry of Rural Development, Land Use Services Division, Farm Budgeting Handbook (Mansa: Ministry of Rural Development, February 1972), pp. 8-10.
14. Ibid.
15. "Minutes, Chiengi Regional Conference [of the United National Independence Party] held on 25 March, 1971," mimeographed, p. 1.
16. See for example, the Minutes of the Provincial Development Committee, 5th January 1967 and 27th April 1968, from file ADM (5), volume II, Nchelenge District Offices.

17. See, for example, "Report on the Findings of the Commission of Inquiry into the Agricultural Finance Corporation and the National Agricultural Marketing Board, Conducted from 23rd to 24th July, 1971," in the files of the National Agricultural Marketing Board, Nchelenge District Offices.
18. "Minutes of the Provincial Development Committee, Meeting Held on the 16th of February 1970," from file ADM/5/1, volume II, Nchelenge District Offices.
19. We are here interpreting observations made at one point in time in terms of an argument about processes that take place over time. Naturally, we never saw a child of 11, who received new clothing from his father, turn 35 and then mail his father a sewing machine; rather, from observations made at one point in time, we inferred that this kind of process was taking place. Such temporally based interpretations should, of course, be based on data gathered from repeated observations over time. I hope to return to Kasumpa to make such observations.